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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
EQUITABLE PRINCIPLES ALLOW FOR AN ORDER GRANTING 
PARTIAL SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE AND MONETARY DAMAGES, 
The order sought by the appellant which would require him to 
convey his land and stock to the respondents in exchange for 
$600,000 is consistent with the principles of equity. The 
purpose of equity is to promote and achieve justice with some 
degree of flexibility. McFadzean v. Lohr, 380 P.2d 20 (Col. 
1963). Granting the relief sought by the appellant would provide 
a just method to address the breach of contract by the 
respondents since monetary damages alone would not adequately 
compensate him. 
Granting the appellant's requested order would not make a new 
contract for the parties because it neither adds nor deletes any 
terms. The Court would be enforcing a legally binding contract 
in a manner that would provide the appellant with a just remedy 
for the respondents1 breach. The cases cited by the respondents 
primarily involved contracts wherein a party was advocating the 
addition or deletion of a clause in order to create a binding 
contract that otherwise would not have been binding and hence the 
court would in effect be making an agreement for the parties. 
While there are few reported decisions, courts have granted 
orders that combined partial specific performance and monetary 
damages in cases involving exchange of land contracts. 
In the case of a contract of exchange of real estate 
it has been held that the vendee may have a specific 
performance of that part of the contract which the 
vendor can perform, with compensation for that part 
which he cannot perform, the same as in ordinary cases 
of real estate. 
71 Am. Jur. 2d Specific Performance, Section 19 (1973). 
As a general rule, partial specific performance with an 
abatement in the purchase price has been granted in Scile of land 
contracts not involving exchanges. 
In cases of contracts for the sale of land, where the 
vendor is unable to furnish full title to the land as 
he contracted for, or there is some deficiency in 
quantity or quality, the vendor may elect to take what 
title or interest the vendor has and to compel him to 
perform to the extent of his ability, with an abatement 
from the purchase price to compensate for that 
deficiency. 
71 Am. Jur. 2d Specific Performance, Section 70 (1973). 
Clearly, orders that combine specific performance and damages 
or abatement have been granted notwithstanding the variance in 
performance it created. The appellant contends that in those 
instances the courts were employing the equitable principle of 
achieving justice to provide the non-breaching party with a 
proper and just remedy rather than simply limiting him to benefit 
of the bargain damages. 
In the case at hand, since the court is unable to grant mutual 
specific performance, because the respondents can not convey the 
ranch property, the court should grant partial specific 
performance with monetary damages. The exchange of land contract 
should be specifically performed in part so as to order the 
appellant to convey his land and stock in exchange for $600,000. 
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No sound reason in equity or legal authority exist to deny such 
equitable relief to the non-breaching party. 
POINT II 
THE APPELLANT HAS NOT ACTED 
IN AN INEQUITABLE MANNER. 
The appellant has acted in a completely proper manner and the 
allegations of inequitable conduct against him by the respondents 
are unfounded. Nothing he ever did or said was misleading 
concerning the 80 acres of farm land he agreed to trade. He 
showed the land to Roger Olson and explicitly pointed out the 
boundaries for the 80 acres. (Tr. 218) . There were no 
misrepresentations by Mr. Barker as to the land or to the water 
stock that he agreed to trade to the respondents. He acted above 
board and properly at all times. 
The allegations that Olson misrepresented the legal effect of 
the earnest money agreement to the respondents obviously did not 
involve Mr. Barker and were not done with his knowledge, consent, 
or authority. He would not be bound by such representations. 
Wells v. Walker Bank & Trust Company, Inc., 590 P.2d 1261 (Utah 
1979) . Furthermore, the evidence at trial strongly questions the 
credibility of the respondents1, allegations. Larry Francis 
testified that after his brother, Howard Francis, got back from 
the first visit to the farm they discussed the farm land with 
Roger Olson but never stated to him that they felt the facts 
concerning the land had been misrepresented. (Tr. 376) . In 
addition, neither one of them halted the preparation of the 
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closing documents at that time. It was sometime after the first 
visit to the farm (30 days) that they decided not to go ahead 
with the transaction. (Tr. 36; 338; 340). These facts indicate 
the farm land had not been misrepresented to them. 
The fact that the respondents believed the earnest money 
agreement was final and legally enforceable is evidenced by their 
instructing Mr. Olson to arrange for the closing documents after 
the earnest money agreement was executed by them on April 21, 
1980. (Tr. 36; 162; 260-262). Furthermore, their knowledge that 
the earnest money agreement was more than a "work sheet" is 
evidenced by a letter Howard Francis wrote to Mr. Barker dated 
July 28, 1980, wherein he stated that he was relieved the closing 
date had passed because, in their opinion, it rendered the 
earnest money agreement ineffective. (Ex. 7; Tr. 33). The 
letter stated: 
[I]t was with some relief to us that you failed to 
consummate the transaction by the closing date. On 
all legal transactions we understand "time is of the 
essence". 
From a legal standpoint we understand it would be an 
exercise in futility for you to file an action for 
specific performance against us . . 
Based on the respondents1 actions and statements, it appears 
clear that they appreciated the legal effect of the earnest money 
agreement. It was not misrepresented to them. 
The trial court properly precluded them from introducing 
evidence of fraud at trial since they had failed to plead the 
defense of fraud with specificity as mandated by Rule 9(b) of the 
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Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The rule states: "In all 
averments of fraud . . . the circumstances constituting fraud . . 
shall be stated with particularity . . .." To meet that 
requirement, the allegations of fraud must set forth the sub-
stance of the acts constituting the alleged wrong. Williams v. 
State Farm Insurance Company, 656 P.2d 966, 972 (Utah 1982). The 
trial court correctly ruled, in the case at hand, that the 
respondents failed to meet that requirement and that the appel-
lant acted properly and with "clean hands" at all times. 
POINT III 
APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO A NEW TRIAL TO DETERMINE 
MONETARY DAMAGES. 
In the event this Court's review of the law and the facts 
determines that the earnest money agreement is a valid contract, 
but that it may not be specifically performed, in whole or part, 
the appellant is entitled to monetary damages. To determine an 
appropriate damage award, this case should be remanded back to 
the trial court for a trial solely on the issue of damages. To 
rule otherwise, would deny the appellant a remedy for the 
breaching parties actions. 
The doctrine of election of remedy does not act as a bar to 
Mr. Barker's claim for damages. The rule is not intended to deny 
a remedy to a party, instead its purpose is to prevent a party 
from obtaining a double recovery. Anaelos v. First Interstate 
Bank of Utah, 671 P.2d 772 (Utah 1983). 
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The doctrine of election of remedies is a technical 
rule of procedure .and its purpose is not to prevent 
recourse to any remedy, but to prevent double redress 
for a single wrong. 
Id. at 778. 
Clearly, Mr. Barker is not seeking a double recovery or 
redress for the respondents1 breach of contract. He does not 
want both the remedy of specific performance and the remedy of 
loss of the benefit of the bargain damages. Accordingly, the 
doctrine should not bar his claim for damages. Angelos, supra is 
consistent with this interpretation of the doctrine. The Court 
held it inapplicable under the facts because the plaintiff was 
not obtaining a double recovery for his claim. The plaintiff was 
entitled to a judgment against one defendant for his claim and he 
was entitled to a second judgment against the other defendants 
for an amount in excess of the first judgment. 
Since the purpose and intent of the doctrine is not violated 
by Mr. Barker, in the case at hand, it should not be employed to 
unjustly bar his uncompensated claim for breach of contract. 
Moreover, several jurisdictions have held that election of remedy 
is not applicable in a lawsuit seeking specific performance or in 
the alternative damages. See, McMahon v. McMahon, 115 S.E. 293 
(1922); Abadallah v. Abadallah. 359 F.2d 170 (3rd Cir. 1966). 
(It should be noted that none of the cases cited by the respon-
dents involved an action for specific performance or in the 
alternative damages.) 
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The court in McMahon, supra, articulately described the 
doctrine and explained why it was inapplicable to an action for 
specific performance or in the alternative damages* 
The so-called "inconsistency of remedies" is not an 
inconsistency between the remedies themselves, for 
this may often happen when the same facts are relied 
upon as the basis of the several alternative remedies; 
but it means that a certain state of facts relied upon 
as the basis of a certain remedy is inconsistent with 
and repugnant to another certain state of facts relied 
upon as the basis of another remedy. . . . 
When a certain state of facts under the law entitles a 
party to alternative remedies, both founded upon the 
identical state of facts, these remedies are not 
considered inconsistent remedies, though they may not 
be able to "stand together"; the enforcement of the 
one remedy being a satisfaction of the parties claim. 
. . . When either party to a contract for the sale of 
land has failed in his obligation, the other is 
entitled to the alternative remedy of specific 
performance in equity or damages at law. They are not 
inconsistent remedies, for they each recognize the 
validity of the contract, and are based upon the 
identical state of facts, the existence of the contract 
and its breach. As between themselves they cannot be 
said to be consistent, for one seeks to secure the 
title to the land and the other proposes to leave the 
title with the other party and have compensation in 
damages. But the test being as above stated, they are 
not considered inconsistent remedies. 
Id. at 294-295. 
It is the appellant's position that the doctrine of election 
of remedy is not applicable to this matter. Accordingly, the 
doctrine should not prevent this Court from remanding for a trial 
on damages, nor should the fact that the appellant did not 
introduce evidence of the value of the respondents1 ranch at 
trial. His actions should not preclude a new trial on the issue 
of damages because the trial court erroneously denied the 
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appellant's motion for a bifurcated trial that would have 
initially decided whether the earnest money agreement was a 
binding contract and if it could be specifically performed and 
later, if necessary, a damage award. Notwithstanding the trial 
court's misunderstanding concerning the status of whether 
the motion to bifurcate was withdrawn or not, the court had 
within its broad powers and discretion the ability to grant the 
motion, renewed the morning of the trial, and erroneously failed 
to do so.1 It is an abuse of discretion to not order a separate 
trial on a specific issue where the separate trial would result 
in convenience and economy of time for the parties, witnesses, 
and the court; and where a determination on the separate trial 
would end the matter without further proceedings. Monaco v. 
Cecconi, 589 P.2d 156, 160 (Mont. 1979). 
The appellant should not have been required to try the issues 
of whether the earnest money agreement was enforceable; whether 
specific performance could be ordered; and the amount of damages 
for breach of contract because of the tremendous inconvenience 
and expense to the parties, witnesses and the court. The cost of 
preparing appraisals for the ranch property, which consisted of 
several thousand acres, should have been warranted only after the 
xThe motion to bifurcate was made prior to the December 1984 
trial setting which was continued on respondent's motion for 
continuance filed the day of the trial. (R. 56-57). Appellant 
contends that it was his intent to withdraw the motion only if it 
would persuade the court to deny the respondent's motion for 
continuance. By allowing the continuance, the motion to bifurcate 
was not withdrawn. 
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trial court found the earnest money agreement binding and 
specific performance not available. At that point, the appellant 
would have known that the expense of preparing appraisals and 
using the time of the court, parties and witnesses warranted a 
trial solely on the issue of monetary damages for breach of 
contract. 
The appellant acted appropriately to request a bifurcation and 
should not be foreclosed from this Court remanding to the trial 
court for a determination of damages if specific performance is 
not ordered in whole or part. 
POINT IV 
THE EARNEST MONEY AGREEMENT IS LEGALLY ENFORCEABLE 
AND DOES NOT FAIL FOR LACK OF DEFINITENESS. 
The earnest money agreement entered into and executed by the 
appellant and the respondents on April 21, 1980, with the 
committal words "Agreed to above", constituted a legally binding 
contract. A meeting of the minds was reached between the parties 
as evidenced by those words and by the language of the agreement 
which was set forth with reasonable certainty so that the parties 
knew what was required of them. Reed v. Alvey, 610 P.2d 1374 
(Utah 1980). Meeting of the minds or mutual assent is 
objectively determined from the words of the contract. 
It is well established in the law that unexpressed 
intentions do not affect the validity of a contract. 
The rule of law is as was stated in Allen v. Bissenae 
and Company. 606 P.2d 1197 (Utah 1980)]: 
The apparent mutual assent of the parties, 
essential to the formation of a contract, 
must be gathered by the language employed by 
them, and the law imputes to a person an 
intention corresponding to the reasonable 
meaning of its words and acts. It judges of 
his intentions by his outward expressions 
and excludes all questions in regard to his 
unexpressed intention. If the words or acts 
judged by a reasonable standard manifest an 
intention to agree to the matter in question, 
that agreement is established and it is 
immaterial what may be the real but 
unexpressed state of his mind upon the 
subj ect. 
Jaramillo v. Farmers Insurance Group. 669 P.2d 1231 (Utah 1983). 
The respondents contention that they did not intend to enter 
into a final binding contract is not expressed anywhere in the 
earnest money agreement, hence their alleged unexpressed inten-
tions should not affect the validity of the agreement. 
The terms of the earnest money agreement describing the 
subject matter of the agreement were set forth in sufficient 
definiteness to make the agreement legally enforceable and in 
compliance with the statute of frauds. The description of the 
properties was not so indefinite as to render the agreement 
unenforceable. A legal description was not used to describe the 
properties, however, the law does not require a legal description 
of the subject matter of an earnest money agreement in order for 
it to be enforceable and for it to comply with the statute of 
frauds. Reed v. Alvev, 610 P.2d at 1374. 
In Reed, the earnest money agreement described the property as 
the "corner of Hillview and Ninth East". The trial court 
determined that the earnest money agreement was too vague, 
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incomplete, and ambiguous for enforcement by a decree of specific 
performance and further found that it was not a legally 
enforceable contract. On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court 
determined that any ambiguity in the language used to describe 
the property could be improved through extrinsic evidence. A 
review of the trial record indicated that extrinsic evidence made 
it clear that "everyone connected with the deal knew what land 
was involved", Id. at 1378, hence the property description viewed 
with extrinsic evidence presented at trial did not render the 
contract unenforceable or preclude an order for specific 
performance. Describing the maxim that allows for extrinsic 
evidence, the Court stated: 
In reviewing the written agreement evidencing the 
contract, and any ambiguity inherent in the language 
used, extrinsic evidence may be considered by the 
court to delineate the intent of the parties and the 
enforceability of the contract. Thus, courts are 
provided a means by which they can look beyond the 
terms found in the written agreement to ascertain the 
intent of the contracting parties. If from this 
examination, of the transaction the courts determine 
the actual contract is certain and the obligation and 
rights of the parties defined, then they may employ 
their equitable powers to enforce the contract via 
specific performance. 
Id., at 1377. 
Application of the maxim set forth in Reed renders the 
description of the Francis property and the Barker property 
sufficiently definite so that the earnest money agreement is 
legally enforceable and capable of enforcement by an order for 
partial specific performance. The Francis property described in 
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the earnest money agreement as "Howard Francis and Larry Francis 
Ranch in Nine Mile Canyon11 was known to all parties involved in 
the transaction. Extrinsic evidence demonstrated that the 
Francis1 desired to sell the entire ranch which was the only 
ranch they owned in Nine Mile Canyon (Tr. 63; 337; 363). Mr. 
Barker had spent a day inspecting the ranch and reviewing a map 
of it hence everyone knew what property entailed the Nine Mile 
Ranch. (Tr. 64) The same analysis follows with the Barker farm 
property. It was described as "80 acres near Wellington, Utah", 
however, extrinsic evidence indicated that all the parties knew 
exactly what land was involved. Mr. Barker took Mr. Olson to the 
location of the 80 acres and explicitly told him and showed him 
the boundaries for the 80 acres. (Tr. 80; 216). Roger Olson, as 
the agent for the Francis •, relayed the information to them so 
they knew exactly what 80 acres of farm land was involved 
in the transaction. (Tr. 30; 195-196; 376). A broker may act 
for both parties and that charges each principal with notice of 
facts he acquires. Foster v. Blake Heights, 53 0 P.2d 815 (Utah 
1974). Furthermore, Howard Francis went to the Barker farm in 
the company of Mr. Olson and personally inspected the farm near 
April 21, 1980. (Tr. 34). Never did the Francis1 complain that 
the farm had been misrepresented nor did they attempt to rescind 
for that reason. 
Reed v. Alvey, supra supports the appellant's position that 
the trial court was correct when it held the earnest money 
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agreement legally enforceable since the material terms of the 
agreement were sufficiently definite or could be rendered 
sufficiently definite through extrinsic evidence. The decision 
further supports the appellant's view that the earnest money 
agreement satisfied the statute of frauds requirement that a 
writing describe the property. This court should follow the 
reasoning in Reed to hold the earnest money agreement enforceable 
in the case at hand. 
The Oregon Supreme Court in Hiaains v. Insurance Company of 
North America. 256 Or. 151, 469 P.2d 766, 769 (1970) upheld an 
earnest money agreement that described the property as 
"description to be furnished. North 70 degrees of description 
in title policy." The court held the agreement was an 
enforceable contract since evidence introduced at the trial 
indicated that both parties understood what land was involved, 
hence the property was sufficiently identified to support 
upholding the contract. 
The two Utah Supreme Court decisions urged by the respondents 
as applicable to this case are clearly distinguishable. In 
Pitcher v. Lauritzen. 18 Utah 2d 368, 423 P.2d 491 (1967), it was 
never made certain to both parties which 30 acres out of the 189 
acres owned by the defendant were to be conveyed to the 
plaintiff. The facts indicated that the defendant never pin-
pointed the exact 30 acres to the plaintiff, unlike Mr. Barker 
who explicitly showed Mr. Olson, the Francis1 agent, which 80 
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acres he intended to be part of the agreement. Furthermore, in 
Pitcher, the contract indicated it was not intended to be a final 
agreement. The writing stated H. . . a final contract of sale 
which shall be on or before May 1, 1962 . . .." On its face, the 
agreement was not intended to be a final and binding contract, 
unlike the case at hand. 
Davis v. Robbins. 30 Utah 2d 338, 517 P.2d 1026 (1973) is 
distinguishable for similar reasons. In Davis the earnest money 
agreement stated in clear terms that the location and description 
of the land to be conveyed by the vendor to the vendee was 
subject to the future agreement of the parties. Their contract 
stated: " . . . less any acreage reserved by the seller. Offer 
contingent upon buyer's approval of net acreage description . . 
." The seller had the right to adjust the amount of land he 
wanted to sell and the buyer had the right to accept or reject 
it. A final agreement had not been reached between the parties. 
Furthermore, the exact land to be conveyed had not been 
identified and was not known to the parties. Davis, obviously 
differs from the case at hand since Mr. Barker's 80 acres was 
identified and known to all parties as was the Francis ranch 
property. 
The fact that the earnest money agreement provided that the 
Francis' had the right to select and retain 40 acres from the 
summer range of the ranch property does not render the agreement 
unenforceable for lack of certainty. The rule of law in Utah has 
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been for many years that a contract is valid and enforceable 
which provides that one party may select a tract of land from a 
larger tract that is described in the contract. Calder v. Third 
District Judicial Court, 2 Utah 2d 309, 273 P.2d 168 (1954). The 
Francis1 sole right to select the 40 acres they desired to retain 
from the ranch property left nothing more to the future agreement 
of the parties. The time for selection would be deemed to be a 
reasonable time after entering the contract. Nixon and Nixon, 
Inc. v. John New and Associates, Inc., 641 P.2d 144 (Utah 1982). 
No principal of equity demands that all terms of a contract be 
set forth in writing because the law makes-certain or complete by 
presumption, rule, or custom and usage. Reed v. Alvey, 610 P.2d 
at 1378. 
The trial court correctly ruled that the earnest money agree-
ment was a legally enforceable contract. The material terms of 
the agreement were set forth in sufficient definiteness to enable 
the agreement to be enforceable and to comply with the statute of 
frauds. The respondents' arguments fail to consider the Reed 
decision which allows for extrinsic evidence to clarify ambiguous 
earnest money agreement terms. Furthermore, the respondents 
self-serving contentions that they never intended to make the 
earnest money agreement a binding final contract carry little 
weight when their intentions were not stated in the agreement. 
This Court should find that a legally binding contract existed 
between the parties. 
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POINT V 
THE EARNEST MONEY AGREEMENT WAS NOT RENDERED 
UNENFORCEABLE WHEN CLOSING DID NOT OCCUR 
ON OR AFTER MAY 1, 1980. 
The earnest money agreement was not rendered unenforceable 
because the parties did not close on May 1, 1980, the date 
specified in the agreement. The general rule of law is that time 
is not of the essence in contracts for the sale of land. Cahoon 
v. Cahoon. 641 P.2d 140 (Utah 1982). 
The general rule with regard to contracts for the sale 
of land is that time is not of the essence unless 
parties expressly indicate otherwise or the circum-
stances surrounding the transaction necessarily imply 
that the parties intended timeliness of performance to 
be of paramount concern. 
Id., at 144. 
When a contract does not disclose that time is of the essence, 
the contract obligations can continue for some time beyond the 
agreed closing date. Century 21 All Western Real Estate v. Webb, 
645 P.2d 52 (Utah 1982); Huck v. Haves, 560 P.2d 1124 (Utah 
1977) . 
In the case at hand, nowhere in the earnest money agreement 
does it state that time is of the essence. Furthermore, the 
circumstances surrounding the transaction do not imply that May 
1, 1980 was intended to be a firm closing date. There was no 
concern to rush a closing in order to meet spring planting 
schedules because Mr. Barker had specifically provided in the 
earnest money agreement that he was going to retain the use of 
the farm throughout the 1980 growing season. At lines 21-22 in 
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the agreement it reads, "Seller [Francis] agree to give use of 
the 80 acres near Wellington to the buyer [Barker] until Oct., 
1980." (Ex. 1). Thus, neither the contract provisions nor the 
attendant circumstances indicate that time was of the essence and 
that the transaction had to close on May 1, 1980. 
The respondents are foreclosed from contending that the 
earnest money agreement is unenforceable because the appellant 
did not tender performance on the closing date or thereafter 
because the respondents, themselves, were unable to close on May 
1, 1980, or anytime thereafter. Howard Francis admitted in his 
deposition that the closing would not be accomplished by May 1 
and Mr. Barker was advised of that fact by Roger Olson. (Howard 
Francis Deposition, pp. 25-26; Tr. 198). Testimony at trial 
established that the Francis1, by instructions to Roger Olson, 
ordered the work on their title documents stopped a short time 
after the closing date past because they had second thoughts 
about the transaction. (Tr. 36; 338-340). The rule of law is 
that a party to a contract does not obtain an advantage from the 
fact that he himself is unable to perform. Huck v. Hayes, 560 
P.2d at 1126. 
It is fundamental that a party to a contract should 
obtain no advantage from the fact that himself is 
unable to perform. Since the defendant had not come 
forth with the agreed title insurance policy 
demonstrating that he could convey a clear and market-
able title as of the proposed closing date, March 8, 
1974, he could neither demand payment by the plaintiff 
on that date, nor claim that the latter was in default 
for failing to make the payment. 
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In Huck, the plaintiff buyer and defendant seller entered into 
an earnest money agreement that provided the defendant would 
furnish marketable title and title insurance to the plaintiff on 
the closing date. When that date arrived, the defendant was 
unable to provide marketable title and so informed the plaintiff. 
Since the defendant was unable to perform, the plaintiff did not 
offer to perform at that time. After the title problems were 
resolved, one and one-half months later, the defendant refused to 
close and tried to justify his refusal on the plaintiff's failure 
to tender performance on the closing date. The court refused to 
accept the defendant's defense since he himself was unable to 
perform on the closing date and ordered specific performance of 
the agreement. 
For another decision supporting appellant's position, see Leaf 
v. Codd, 41 Idaho 547, 240 P. 593 (1925) ("[t]he vendor, to make 
the plaintiff's delay available as a defense, must have performed 
or have been ready and willing to perform all the terms of the 
contract stipulated for on his part.") 
The respondents may not claim, as the defendant in Huck vainly 
attempted, that the earnest money agreement is unenforceable and 
void because Mr. Barker did not tender performance on the May 1 
closing date or thereafter, since the respondents themselves were 
unable to close on May 1 or anytime thereafter. The appellant 
was ready, willing, and able to tender performance and close the 
transaction at or near May 1, however, his actions would have 
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been useless and futile. (Tr. 162-163). Passing the May 1 
closing date did not render the earnest money agreement 
unenforceable. 
POINT VI 
THE APPELLANT DID TENDER PERFORMANCE NEVERTHELESS 
HE WAS EXCUSED FROM TENDERING PERFORMANCE 
PRIOR TO BRINGING SUIT. 
The appellant tendered performance prior to bringing suit when 
Mr. Jensen, his counsel, contacted the Francis1 and stated his 
clients willingness and ability to close the transaction by June 
10, 1980. (Tr. 222, Ex. 5). Notwithstanding appellant's tender 
of performance, it is the rule of law that an action for specific 
performance may be maintained without tendering performance if 
the plaintiff had an excuse for not tendering performance. Reed 
v. Alvev. 610 P.2d at 1374. 
Generally, in a suit for specific performance of a 
contract for the sale of realty, the purchaser must 
show that he paid the purchase price, or tendered it, 
to the defendant prior to the commencement of the 
suit. Howeyer, an action for specific performance may 
also be maintained if the plaintiff presents an excuse 
for his failure to make such payment or tender and 
avers his ability, readiness and willingness to pay 
the contract amount. 
The plaintiff's ability and willingness to 
tender the purchase amount as averred in his complaint 
is sufficient to support a suit for specific 
performance of the contract. . . . 
Reed at 1379. 
Mr. Barker was excused from tendering performance to the 
Francis because they had clearly indicated to him that they would 
not accept it and they would not complete the transaction. 
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(Testimony of Howard Francis Tr. 36; Ex. 6, Ex. 7, Ex. 9, Ex. 
14) . It is sufficient that Mr. Barker pled he was ready, 
willing, and able to tender performance. (R. 42-45). Although 
he did actually tender performance as herein explained, he was 
not required to actually tender performance before bringing suit 
because it would have been a useless act. The Utah Supreme Court 
in Thomas v. Johnson, 55 Utah 424, 186 P. 437 (1919), stated: 
It is a basic premise of equity that the law will 
never compel a person to do that which is vain or 
useless. 
It is well established that a plaintiff is excused from 
tendering performance prior to bringing suit when the defendant 
has indicated that the tender would not be accepted. Wolianski 
v. Miller, 661 P.2d 1145 (Ariz. App. 1983); Alk v. Lanini. 656 
P.2d 367 (Or. App. 1982); Chandler v. Independent School District 
No. 12, 625 P.2d 620 (Okl. 1981). 
In Alk v. Laney, supra. the plaintiff buyers entered into an 
earnest money agreement for the purchase of land with the 
defendant owners. When the defendants could not obtain 
marketable title by the closing date, the parties entered into an 
agreement to extend the closing date while the defendants 
prosecuted a quiet title action. After the quiet title action 
was resolved, the plaintiffs attempted to proceed with the 
transaction, however, the defendants indicated they no longer 
wanted to sell. Several months thereafter, the plaintiffs placed 
a down payment in escrow and brought an action for specific 
performance. The trial court ruled that they had not made a 
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timely tender and denied specific performance. On appeal, 
the court reversed and held a purchaser need not tender 
performance when the seller has indicated that the tender would 
not be accepted. An order of specific performance was entered. 
A purchaser need not tender performance in order to 
preserve his right to specific performance when the 
seller has repudiated the contract, or has otherwise 
indicated that tender would not be accepted. . . . We 
hold that the plaintiffs were not required to make a 
useless tender of down payment amount and that the 
absence of tender did not forfeit the plaintiff's 
right to demand specific performance. 
Id. at 370. 
In the case at hand, the appellant's tender of performance was 
established at trial by his testimony, Mr. Jensen's testimony, 
and by the introduction into evidence of Mr. Jensen's letter to 
the Francis', his deed for the sale of the farm land and his bill 
of sale for the water stock. (Tr. 163; 167; 222; Exhibits 5; 29; 
and 30) . His efforts to secure the mineral rights to the land 
would have enabled him to convey those interests. (Tr. 213; 
242-243; 253). Although the appellant tendered performance, he 
was not required to do so prior to bringing suit because the 
Francis' would not have accepted it. As such, he is not fore-
closed from seeking an order for specific performance. 
POINT VII 
THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES TO THE 
APPELLANT WAS PROPER. 
The trial court's award of attorney's fees to the appellant 
was proper since he was the prevailing party in his action for 
enforcement of the earnest money agreement. His right to 
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attorney's fees is set forth in the agreement on lines 45-46 
which reads: "If either party fails so to do, he agrees to pay 
all expenses of enforcing this agreement, or of any right arising 
out of the breach thereof, including a reasonable attorney's 
fee." 
Pursuant to the terms of the agreement, the appellant had the 
right to receive an award for attorney's fees. The trial court 
properly made an award based on the appellant's contractual 
rights. It is well established that Utah follows the rule that 
attorney's fees may be awarded if provided by contract. Turtle 
Management, Inc. v. Haggis Management, 645 P.2d 667 (Utah 1982). 
The amount the trial court awarded the appellants as reason-
able attorney's fees rested within its discretion and should not 
be disturbed on appeal in the absence of an abuse of discretion. 
Turtle, supra; Yreka United, Inc. v. Harrison, 510 P.2d 775 (Id. 
1973). It is not an abuse of discretion to make an attorney's 
fees award that exceeds the amount recovered on a contract. 
Lanier v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 694 P. 2d 625 (Utah 
1985). In Lanier, the Utah Supreme Court affirmed an attorney's 
fees award of $19,000 in a contract dispute involving a recovery 
of $11,350. Holding that the attorney's fees were not limited by 
the damage award, the court stated: 
The total amount of the attorney's fees awarded in 
this case can not be said to be unreasonable just 
because it is greater than the amount recovered in the 
contract. The amount of the damages awarded in a case 
does not place a necessary limit on the amount of 
attorney's fees that can be awarded. 
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Furthermore, contrary to the appellant's contention 
that attorney's fees should be determined on the basis 
of an equitable standard, attorney's fees, when 
awarded as allowed by law, are awarded as a matter of 
legal right. 
Id. at 625. 
Additionally, in Lanier the Court stated that an award for 
reasonable attorney's fees is not set by what the attorney 
actually bills nor the number of hours spent on the case. The 
trial judge may consider other factors, such as the provisions of 
the Utah Code of Professional Responsibility DR2-106, to 
establish a reasonable attorney's fees award. 
A court may consider, among other factors, the 
difficulty of the litigation, the efficiency of the 
attorneys in presenting the case, the reasonableness 
of the number of hours spent on the case, the fee 
customarily charged and the locality for similar 
services, the amount involved in the case and the 
result obtained, and the expertise and experience of 
the attorneys involved. 
Id. at 625. 
The trial court, in the case at hand, properly took these 
matters into consideration when it established the amount of the 
attorney's fees it awarded to the appellant. His ruling was not 
an abuse of discretion, but rather represented an award the 
appellant was entitled to by contractual right and verified by an 
affidavit and other documentation submitted to the court by 
counsel for the appellant. All attorney's fees and expenses went 
toward enforcing the earnest money agreement and the appellant's 
rights for breach thereof, as provided in the agreement, hence, 
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he is entitled to recover them as the prevailing party in this 
action. 
CONCLUSION 
This court should rule that the earnest money agreement was a 
binding legal contract and that an appropriate remedy for the 
respondents' breach of contract is partial specific performance. 
The appellant's land and water stock should be exchanged for 
$600,000. In the event specific performance may not be ordered, 
this court should remand to the trial court for a damage 
determination. 
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